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In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere around the world, a key counterterrorism concern was the possible radicalization of Muslims living in the United States. The purpose of the study was to examine and identify characteristics and practices of four American Muslim communities that have experienced varying levels of radicalization. The communities were selected because they were home to Muslim-Americans that had experienced isolated instances of radicalization. They were located in four distinct regions of the United States, and they each had distinctive histories and patterns of ethnic diversity.

This objective was mainly pursued through interviews of over 120 Muslims located within four different Muslim-American communities across the country (Buffalo, New York; Houston, Texas; Seattle, Washington; and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina), a comprehensive review of studies an literature on Muslim-American communities, a review of websites and publications of Muslim-American organizations and a compilation of data on prosecutions of Muslim-Americans on violent terrorism-related offenses.

These data are part of NACJD's Fast Track Release and are distributed as they were received from the data depositor. The files have been zipped by NACJD for release, but not checked or processed except for the removal of direct identifiers. Users should refer to the accompanying readme file for a brief description of the files available with this collection and consult the investigator(s) if further information is needed.

The study aimed to develop and empirically test a dynamic risk assessment model of radicalization process characteristics of homegrown terrorists inspired by Al Qaeda's ideology. The New York Police Department (NYPD) model developed by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt was chosen as the basis for creating a typology of overt and detectable indicators of individual behaviors widely thought to be associated with extremism. Specific behavioral cues associated with each stage of radicalization were coded and used to estimate the sequencing of behaviors and the duration of the average radicalization trajectory. Out of 331 homegrown American Jihadists (Group A), 135 were selected for further examination of their radicalization (Group B). Data were collected from public records ranging from social media postings by the offenders themselves to evidence introduced in the adjudication of the offenses for which the offenders were incarcerated. Life histories were compiled for Group B, whose detailed biographies were used to chart the timelines of their radicalization trajectories.

The collection includes an Excel file which contains one data table for Group A (10 variables, n=331) and two data tables for Group B (32 variables, n=135 and 5 variables, n=135, respectively). An accompanying codebook file details the variables in these tables. There is also a document with approximately 1 page narratives for each of the 135 individuals in Group B. A file containing a key indicating the names of the subjects is not available with this collection.

Parents, siblings, partners, and friends are often the first people to suspect a loved one is on the trajectory towards targeted violence or terrorism. These intimate bystanders are well positioned to facilitate prevention efforts if there are known and trusted reporting pathways to law enforcement or other resources. Little is known in the United States about the reporting processes for intimate bystanders to targeted violence or terrorism. This study is built on previous Australian and United Kingdom studies to understand the processes of intimate bystanders in the United States, in order to inform new, localized and contextually-sensitive understandings of and approaches to community reporting issues.

Qualitative-quantitative interviews were conducted from March 2021 to July 2021 virtually over Zoom with 123 community members living in California and Illinois. The researchers describe their perspectives on barriers, facilitators, and pathways. The study sought to enhance prior studies with a larger and more demographically-diverse sample. It included a focus on ISIS/Al-Qa'eda-inspired foreign-terrorism, White Power movement-inspired domestic terrorism, and--of particular relevance to the US---non-ideologically motivated targeted, workplace violence.

The study assesses the extent of commonalities between individuals who become involved in violent extremist groups and criminal gangs, and the processes by which individuals engage in each group. Following this comparison, the extent to which the empirical results support the potential for anti-gang programs to bolster the resilience of communities against violent extremism and other forms of crime is assessed.

Quantitative assessment was conducted by comparing individuals included in the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset with a subset of individuals drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) along a number of demographic, social, and socioeconomic characteristics.

Supplementary survey data was also collected from 45 former and current gang members in the United States concurrently with long-form interviews, covering a range of variables including background characteristics, demographic information, and attitudes among the respondents.

This project examines the trajectory of radicalization of jihadists and Incels with two broad objectives in mind. First, to develop new integrated computational technology that can mine, monitor, and screen for the occurrence of behaviors associated with dangerously escalating extremism in large heterogenous databases and provide early warnings of individuals or groups on behavioral trajectories toward extremist violence. Second, to harness data science methodologies to enable rapid, semi-automated support for law enforcement analysts and social science researchers to produce structured behavioral indicator profiles from text sources.

The study operated from the premise that being that violent extremists are a rare, complex phenomenon, it is futile to search for a profile of extremism. Rather, it is better to focus on explaining how people come to embrace violent extremism. This path, referred to here as a radicalization trajectory, implies that an arc exists leading the perpetrator from entertaining extremist ideas to action, and that there is a somewhat predictable pathway from a normal, if perhaps angry state, to the perpetration of a violent attack in the name of the ideology. Two teams were combined to analyze radicalization trajectories: data collection and analysis led by Brandeis University and technology development led by Colorado State University (CSU).

The questions revolving around the technological development were as follows: Can tools that rigorously examine and account for the activities of close associates better predict the likelihood that an individual would engage in violent extremism? Which risk assessment indicators for violent extremism in the extant literature are detectable via automated or semi-automated technologies, and what databases and datasets must be integrated to facilitate this detection? Can computationally efficient tools be used to mine these databases for the specific purposes of monitoring and screening for individuals and small groups posing a significant risk for violence?

Users should refer to the data collection notes field below for additional information about study citation.

How is the process of radicalization understood over time? Do current radicalization to violence differ from earlier waves? How can these understandings be utilized to prevent radicalization to violence and--equally important--understand the reach and impact of programs designed to do so? The overall goal of this project was to pursue the following aims:

• Aim 1: To understand how adversity and social bonds relate to changes in openness to violent extremism over time.
• Aim 2: To evaluate experience and perception of, and the effectiveness of, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) activities.
• Aim 3: To evaluate mechanisms of change in violent extremism.
• Aim 4: To understand similarities/ differences in experiences and/or histories of Somali youth who joined Al-Shabab vs. those known to have been killed in Syria, fighting with ISIS and other terrorist groups.

The above aims were accomplished through extending an ongoing longitudinal research program to span 5 years, and expanding a psychological autopsy sample to include Somali youth who have left Minneapolis and been killed fighting with ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria. Data collection for the longitudinal study consisted of conducting an additional wave of structured interviews with Somali youth (between the ages of 21-33); interviews included assessments of structural adversity (resettlement hardships, trauma exposure, and discrimination), social factors (connection to the resettlement community and/or Somali diaspora community, internet use, and level of acculturation) delinquency, gang involvement, civic engagement, and support for legal and illegal (violent) actions in support of political change. The researchers used latent transition analysis (LTA), generalized estimating equation modeling, and linear regression modeling to accomplish Aims 1-3. Aim 4 was accomplished by using a combination of open source data analysis, psychological autopsy and case analysis methodology. The researchers expanded our current in-depth case studies of Somali youth who left Minneapolis to join al-Shabaab (N = 23, males aged 22-30) to include those who joined ISIS or Al-Nusra (N=4, males aged 18-29). Research questions associated with Aim 4 were analyzed using a psychological autopsy method of developing case histories. Case histories were coded for themes and analyzed for convergence or divergence with case histories of youth who joined Al-Shabab. Scholarly products include manuscripts in journals relevant to criminal justice, policy briefs, and interim and final reports. This project builds on partnerships between Boston Children's Hospital, Somali communities, and Georgia State University.

The Homeland Security in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions study drew upon data collected from 350 small (1-25 full time sworn officers) law enforcement agencies nationwide to address four gaps in the homeland security research literature and clarify/expand upon an empirically-derived model of homeland security preparedness and organizational efficacy.

• Whether physical and relational proximity to large agency peers facilitates the development of homeland security preparedness and improves perceptions of organizational efficacy (the capacity of an organization to respond) in small agencies and, conversely, whether the geographic isolation of small, rural agencies inhibits homeland security efforts.
• Whether efficacy of efforts to enhance homeland security is not just a function of perceived/actual risk or funding, but also other "institutional pressures", such as books and journal publications, as well as conferences, training, and other professional networks and channels.
• Assessments of preparedness outcomes through "organizational efficacy", the perception about the organization's ability to accomplish its goals.
• The lack of theoretical context, such as contingency and institutional theory frameworks, used to examine data on preparedness and organizational efficacy.

These data are part of NACJD's Fast Track Release and are distributed as they were received from the data depositor. The files have been zipped by NACJD for release, but not checked or processed except for the removal of direct identifiers. Users should refer to the accompanying readme file for a brief description of the files available with this collection and consult the investigator(s) if further information is needed.

This study sought to empirically test one of the most widely cited perspectives relative to radicalization and the growth of social movements - Identity and Framing Theory. Identity and framing perspectives contend that radicalization towards violence can be theorized as a process which entails a journey, typically from a non- or less-radical identity and corresponding orientation, towards a more radical identity and corresponding orientation which enhances the likelihood of employing targeted forms of violence because the prospect of desired change is seen as laying outside the realm of legitimate modes of challenge and expression within the targeted institutional arena. As implied, a key component of the process is the adoption or evolution of a radical identity.

The study collection includes 1 SPSS data file (ATS_NIJ_FRAMING_QUANTITATIVE_DATASET.sav, n=465, 16 variables) and 1 Excel data file (ATS_NIJ_FRAMING_QUALITATIVE_DATASET.xls, n=38, 17 variables).

Despite the critical information security issues faced by academic institutions, little research has been conducted at the policy, practice, or theoretical levels to address these issues, and few policies or cost-effective controls have been developed. The purpose of this research study was three-fold: (1) to create an empirically-based profile of issues and approaches, (2) to develop a practical road map for policy and practice, and (3) to advance the knowledge, policy, and practice of academic institutions, law enforcement, government, and researchers. The study design incorporated three methods of data collection: a quantitative field survey, qualitative one-on-one interviews, and an empirical assessment of the institutions' network activity.

Survey data collection involved simple random sampling of 600 academic institutions from the Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) database, recruitment via postcard, telephone, and email, Web-based survey administration, and three follow-ups. Results are contained in Part 1, Quantitative Field Survey Data. Interview data collection involved selecting a sample size of 15 institutions through a combination of simple random and convenience sampling, recruitment via telephone and email, and face-to-face or telephone interviews. Results are contained in Part 2, Qualitative One-on-One Interview Data. Network analysis data collection involved convenience sampling of two academic institutions, recruitment via telephone and email, installing Higher Education Network Analysis (HENA) on participants' systems, and six months of data collection. Results are in Part 3, Subject 1 Network Analysis Data, and Part 4, Subject 2 Network Analysis Data.

The Quantitative Field Survey Data (Part 1) contains 19 variables on characteristics of institutions that participated in the survey component of this study, as well as 263 variables derived from responses to the Information Security in Academic Institutions Survey, which was organized into five sections: Environment, Policy, Information Security Controls, Information Security Challenges, and Resources. The Qualitative One-on-One Interview Data (Part 2) contains qualitative responses to a combination of closed-response and open-response formats. The data are divided into the following seven sections: Environment, Institution's Potential Vulnerability, Institution's Potential Threat, Information Value and Sharing, End Users, Countermeasures, and Insights. Data collected through the empirical analysis of network activity (Part 3 and Part 4) include type and protocol of attack, source and destination information, and geographic location.

This study examined the geospatial contexts of where terrorism incidents occur, where terrorists plan and prepare for their crimes, and where terrorists reside in the United States. The researchers examined data linked to terrorism-related incidents in the United States from the time of the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 through 2019. Using these data, the researchers applied innovative analytical methodologies of Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) and Conjunctive Analysis of Case Configurations (CACC) to evaluate their utility in assessing risk of terrorism.

Risk terrain modeling is a method for identifying situational, place-based risk factors most associated with locations where terrorist incidents are likely to be planned or occur. This method looks at specific aspects of the physical landscape, such as locations of buildings or parking lots. The place-based analysis approach to terrorism investigation represents a shift from the conventional research emphasis on targeting suspicious persons by their demographic or other traits. This approach investigates the importance of location in explanations of crime and terrorism.

According to the American Terrorism Study, during this time between 2001 (after 9/11 and 2019) there were 296 terrorism incidents and 617 pre-incident activities occurred where the state was known. In addition, there were 420 known residences tied to terrorism-related incidents in particular states.

The study examines the behavioral underpinnings of three types of United States-based offenders: solo terrorists, lone-actor terrorists, and individuals who engage in mass casualty violence but lack an ideological motivation (aka mass murderers). In particular, the researchers compare the developmental, antecedent behavioral, and ideological factors that crystallize within the offender and are later expressed behaviorally via an attack.

The data address the following research questions: What are the similarities and differences between lone actor terrorists and solo mass murderers, in terms of sociodemographic characteristics and behavioral traits prior to, during, and after their attack? Can risk factors associated with delinquency and criminal offenses also help predict low-likelihood, high impact events such as lone actor terrorist attacks and mass murders? Do these factors remain the same over time?

To complete the research objectives, the researchers used an open source methodological design, relying solely on text materials available within the public domain. Data were coded and then statistically analyzed using bivariate and multivariate tests. The sample (n = 186) was limited to United States-based offenders who operated between 1990 and 2013 and were identifiable through publicly available materials.

These data are part of NACJD's Fast Track Release and are distributed as they were received from the data depositor. The files have been zipped by NACJD for release, but not checked or processed. Users should refer to the accompanying readme file for a brief description of the files available with this collection and consult the investigator(s) if further information is needed.

Typically, NACJD's Fast Track Release requires all direct identifiers to be removed or masked. As the sources of information for this collection are publicly available, direct identifiers were left within the collection.

This study created the largest and most comprehensive database ever created to date on lone wolf terrorism. It includes 1 Excel data file (LONEWOLF_NIJ_HAMM_SPAAIJ_2014_unlocked.xlsx; n=98, 23 variables). The information was gathered from an extensive review of previous research, biographies and memoirs, journalistic sources, government reports, court documents, encyclopedias and documentary films.

Qualitative interviews were conducted as part of this research, but these interviews were not made available for archiving.

These data are part of NACJD's Fast Track Release and are distributed as they were received from the data depositor. The files have been zipped by NACJD for release, but not checked or processed except for the removal of direct identifiers. Users should refer to the accompanying readme file for a brief description of the files available with this collection and consult the investigator if further information is needed.

This study examined the longevity of individual terrorists using data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS).

Using these data, researchers examined the longevity of individual terrorists in relationship to five major factors: 1) the possible effects of changes in the Attorney General's Guidelines for terrorism investigations; 2) the impact of ideology, which may indirectly affect longevity through perpetrator and incident characteristics; 3) lone actors versus group participation; 4) the extent of participation in preparatory activity; and 5) the sophistication of the incidents in which the person participated.

Previous ATS research funded through National Institute of Justice (NIJ) by focusing on individual terrorists, instead of terrorist groups.

The collection includes 1 SPSS data file: ICPSR_Data_File_Edit.sav (n=346; 15 variables).

Current research that seeks to inform terrorism prevention, intervention, and interdiction efforts has been hampered by at least three problems: the lack of adequate control groups, a tendency to conceptually conflate radicalization with mobilization, and a preponderance of research designs that only include data on the perpetrator or the event, but not both. This project addresses these shortcomings by collecting data that includes control groups consisting of non-violent offenders, non-mobilized ideologues, and unsuccessful terrorists, and by modeling mobilization as the interaction between individual characteristics, social networks, and event-level situational opportunities for action. The integrated approach of this research isolates the interactive factors that distinguish violent from nonviolent offenders, identifies the individual, network, and event-level variables that are significantly related to extremist mobilization, and determines which law enforcement interdiction strategies are most likely to succeed in stopping terrorist attacks.

This research expands on the NIJ-funded Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) and Social Networks of American Radicals (SoNAR) datasets to include event-level information on more than 1,400 United States-based extremist plots and financial crimes from 1974-2021. These event data can be linked to data on the individuals and networks contained in the PIRUS and SoNAR datasets, respectively, in order to build a fully relational database on radicalization characteristics, social-network dynamics, and event-level details and outcomes. Data collection used open-sources, including media reports, unsealed court documents, unclassified government reports, and other open-source archived content. To strengthen the reliability and validity of the analyses, at least 25% of the data were double coded, and the project team dedicated the last phase of data collection to conduct rigorous quality control. To analyze these data, the project team used three methods: descriptive and bivariate analyses, advanced regression methods with regularization, and multi-step configurational methods on a subset of 50 event cases.

These data are currently available as an Excel workbook. The "Plots" sheet contains data on premeditated violent and non-violent crimes. The "Financial Crimes" sheet contains data on financial crimes only. Please refer to the ICPSR README for more information.

This project sought to improve understanding of the characteristics of bias crime in the United States by collecting and analyzing data on a national sample of offenders. The database - The Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS) - includes information on 966 adult offenders who committed hate crimes in the United States from 1990-2018. BIAS includes offenders who committed crimes that were motivated by bias based on (1) race, ethnicity, or ancestry; (2) religion; (3) sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity; (4) disability; and (5) age. BIAS includes more than 100 variable fields that cover all aspects of an offender's background, including their demographic characteristics, family dynamics, education and employment histories, mental health concerns, criminal records, peer associations, and hate group affiliations. BIAS also include details on the nature of the offender's crime, such as whether it was violent or non-violent, spontaneous or premeditated, or was perpetrated alone, with a group, or while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The spread of and involvement in domestic extremist organizations are some of the most pressing issues facing the criminal justice field. There is little research studying the trajectories of former members of extremist organizations. This project begins to address the gaps in knowledge about radicalization and exit by gathering firsthand accounts from former members of white supremacist organizations in the U.S.

The goal of this project was to understand the pathways to disengagement and deradicalization among former white supremacists to provide justice and community organizations with useful information to support prevention and intervention strategies. There is a dearth of systematic information about the motivations, trajectories, and barriers involved with the disengagement and deradicalization process. This project was designed to provide a necessary and foundational assessment of the processes involved with becoming a former extremist. This project charted the social and psychological processes involved in exiting domestic extremist organizations by analyzing the detailed life history accounts of 47 former domestic extremists.

This study compiled data on American jihadists and other Islamic extremists recruited since the early 1990s. Specifically, "homegrown" terrorist, referring to Americans and other Westerners who are inspired to commit acts of terrorism or support those committing these acts in their home country on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations, are the main focus. The purpose of this research is to address the central question: How do foreign terrorist organizations mobilize Americans to carry out attacks on their behalf?

Variables collected include extremist group affiliation, criminal background, foreign fighter history if applicable, coconspirators and their relationship, and the location and nature of terrorist plots. Demographic variables include sex, ethnicity, immigration status, education, and profession.

These data are part of NACJD's Fast Track Release and are distributed as they were received from the data depositor. The files have been zipped by NACJD for release, but not checked or processed except for the removal of direct identifiers. Users should refer to the accompanying readme file for a brief description of the files available with this collection and consult the investigator(s) if further information is needed.

This study identified the temporal dimensions of terrorists' precursor conduct to determine if these behaviors occurred in a logically sequenced pattern, with a particular focus on the identification of sequenced patterns that varied by group type, group size, and incident type. The study specifically focused on how these pre-incident activities were associated with the successful completion or prevention of terrorist incidents and how they differed between categories of terrorism. Data utilized for this study came from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), a database that includes "officially designated" federal terrorism cases from 1980-October 1, 2016, collected for the National Institute of Justice.

The project focused on three major issues related to terrorists' precursor behaviors:

• A subgroup analysis of temporal, crime-specific patterns by group type,
• The nature of the planning process, and
• Factors associated with the outcomes of terrorist incidents (success or failure).

The collection contains 2 SPSS data files, Final_Hypothesis_Data_Set.sav (n=550; 16 variables) and Final_Sequencing_Antecedent_Temporal.sav (n=2354; 16 variables), and 1 plain text file, Recode_Syntax.txt.