Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 1987-1998 (ICPSR 9513)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 1999 (ICPSR 3104)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2000 (ICPSR 3495)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2001 (ICPSR 3498)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2002 (ICPSR 4109)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2003 (ICPSR 4631)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2004 (ICPSR 4628)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2005 (ICPSR 4609)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2006 (ICPSR 20102)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2007 (ICPSR 22625)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2008 (ICPSR 25426)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2009 (ICPSR 28603)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2010 (ICPSR 35338)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2011 (ICPSR 35341)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2012 (ICPSR 35344)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2013 (ICPSR 35347)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2014 (ICPSR 36570)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2015 (ICPSR 36573)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2016 (ICPSR 36980)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2017 (ICPSR 37991)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2018 (ICPSR 38006)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2019 (ICPSR 38021)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2020 (ICPSR 38551)
Organizations Convicted in Federal Criminal Courts, 2021 (ICPSR 38554)
Preventing and Controlling Corporate Crime: The Dual Role of Corporate Boards and Legal Sanctions, United States, 1996-2013 (ICPSR 37463)
This project consists of secondary analysis material (syntax only, no data). The original study that the material pertains to examines two distinct but related types of corporate crime prevention and control mechanisms--one that rests on firm governance (specifically, the Board of Directors) and the other on formal legal interventions. Specifically, the study examines whether (ceteris paribus) firms with more gender diversity on their boards are less involved in offending than firms whose boards are less diverse and whether changes in board diversity over time affect firm offending patterns. Of additional interest is how firms respond to legal discovery and punishment.
Do they change their governance structures (i.e., become more diverse) due to formal legal discovery?
Are firms generally deterred from reoffending (recidivism) when discovered or does deterrence depend on the government's response to offenders?
In particular, are certain regimes (criminal, civil, or regulatory) more successful at crime control than others?
Relevant data are collected from a variety of secondary sources, including corporate financial, statistical, and governance information. These data are then linked to cases of corporate offending (accounting fraud, bribery, environmental and anti-competitive) for 3,327 US based companies between 1996 and 2013.
Analyses-NIJ-5.21.2019--2-.do: Syntax (Stata) used to create type of offense count; domain of processing (civil, criminal, regulatory); offense distribution (by corporate year), female board membership (count and percent); Reoffending (by enforcement type and governance characteristics).