Showing 1 – 8 of 8 results.
Curated
ABC News/Washington Post Iraq War Polls, January-February 1991 (ICPSR 9563)
Released/updated on: 2009-01-20
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 1991-01-13--1991-02-27
This data collection consists of telephone surveys concerning the Persian Gulf war between Iraq and the allied Coalition forces. Part 1, conducted just prior to the January 15th deadline set by the United Nations Security Council for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, asked respondents if the United States should take military action, what the likelihood was that the United States would go to war, how long the war would last, and how many casualties would result. Additional questions included whether the United States should hold further talks with Iraq, whether a diplomatic solution was possible, if the United States should agree to an Arab-Israeli conference, and if respondents approved of actions taken by George Bush and Congress. Parts 2-9 were conducted after the outbreak of war. Respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of George Bush's and Israel's handling of the situation, of the United States' having gone to war, and of American anti-war protests. They were also asked how long they thought the war would last, how many casualties would result, who would win, if enough had been done to seek a diplomatic solution, and if the United States and her allies had been right to attack Iraq. In addition, respondents were asked how they rated the job the United States military was doing, if the air war would be enough or if a ground war would be necessary, if the government was releasing enough or too much information, if Israel should strike back at Iraq for the missile attacks, if the respondent was afraid to travel or afraid of increased terrorism, if the United States was heading toward another Viet Nam, and whether moral principle or economic reality had been the motive behind American troops' being sent to the Persian Gulf. Other topics covered include the final objective of the war (driving Iraq out of Kuwait or Saddam Hussein from power), allied bombing in Baghdad and issues surrounding hits on possible military targets that would result in civilian casualties, the presence of American reporters in Iraq, talks between Iraq and the Soviet Union seeking a diplomatic solution, and a set of questions addressing possible outcomes for Saddam Hussein and the respondent's personal feelings regarding him. Background information provided includes age, race, sex, political party identification, state/region of residence, and if the respondent had friends or relatives serving in the military in the Gulf region.
Curated
CBS News/New York Times Monthly Poll, December 1990 (ICPSR 9618)
Released/updated on: 2010-10-07
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 1990-12-09--1990-12-11
This data collection is part of a continuing series of monthly surveys that evaluate the Bush presidency and solicit opinions on a variety of political and social issues. Demographic information collected includes sex, age, race, education, family income, religion, ethnicity, political orientation, party preference, and voting behavior. Issues addressed in this survey include the biggest threat to the respondent's way of life in 1991, Bush's handling of the economy and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, whether the United States did the right thing by sending troops to Saudi Arabia and whether Bush explained the situation in the Middle East well enough so that people understood why troops were sent, whether the United States would end up fighting Iraq or resolving the situation peacefully, whether the Bush Administration had tried hard enough to reach a diplomatic solution or had been too quick to involve American military forces, and whether the United States should negotiate a compromise with Saddam Hussein or hold to its original demand that Iraq leave Kuwait entirely. Respondents were also asked whether they thought Iraq would actually release all the hostages by the end of the month and if their release should influence the United States' willingness to negotiate a compromise with Hussein, whether the United States should begin military actions against Iraq if they did not withdraw their troops from Kuwait by January 15 or wait longer to see if economic sanctions worked, and how long the United States should wait to see if the trade embargo worked. Respondents were also queried as to their agreement/disagreement with the following statements: the troubles among Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are just a conflict between different groups of Arabs that the United States should stay out of, the crisis in the Persian Gulf will continue as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, public debate over whether the United States should fight Iraq will hurt the effort to persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and the military draft should be reinstated to provide soldiers for the current Mideast situation. Those surveyed were also asked to choose a statement that comes closest to expressing their beliefs about God, to indicate whether they believed that prayer could change lives, and whether they went to a private doctor, hospital emergency room, or clinic when sick. In addition, the survey posed a series of questions related to responsibilities of adult children toward aging parents, various parenting situations, romantic love, birth control, beer commercials, sponsorship of sporting events by cigarette companies, marital infidelity, marital status, apologizing in marriage, and topics eliciting arguments in marriage.
Curated
CBS News/New York Times Persian Gulf War Polls, January-February 1991 (ICPSR 9619)
Released/updated on: 2006-01-12
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 1991-01-11--1991-02-25
This series of interviews tracks public opinion regarding the Persian Gulf War from the period immediately prior to the initiation of bombing in January 1991 to the ensuing ground combat in February. In addition to monitoring the evolving war, these data also provide an ongoing evaluation of the Bush presidency during that time period. Part 1 (January 5-7) examines sending troops to Saudi Arabia vs. staying out, the likelihood of war, Bush's efforts to find diplomatic solutions, negotiating with Saddam Hussein vs. forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait, the possibility of terrorist attacks in the United States, how closely the respondent followed the news of the Persian Gulf situation, military action against Iraq vs. waiting for sanctions to work, requiring a congressional declaration of war, Congress voting on a declaration of war before or after the January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal, the January 9 meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq's foreign minister, attempting to meet with Hussein before January 15, and what might happen in the Persian Gulf in the event of war or otherwise. Part 2 (January 11-13) poses questions identical to Part 1 and addresses new issues, including whether Bush had already decided prior to the January 15 deadline to send troops into battle, whether a Kuwaiti offer to trade part of its territory in exchange for Iraq's withdrawal would be an acceptable resolution to the crisis, whether congressional authorization of the use of force would increase the likelihood of war, how congressmen should vote concerning the authorization of force, what Bush should do if only one house of Congress votes in favor of the use of force, whether the failure of the meeting between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister on January 9 made war more likely, and more questions related to what might happen in the Persian Gulf in the event of war or otherwise. Part 3 (January 5-7, 17 Panel) replicates both Part 1, the January 5-7 survey, and Part 5, the January 17 survey. It also examines new issues, including whether the United States did the right thing in initiating military action against Iraq, whether the war would last weeks or months, the number of expected American casualties in the war, whether the United States should remove Saddam Hussein from power in addition to driving Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, bombing military targets in heavily populated civilian areas vs. targets not in heavily populated areas, impressions of how the war was proceeding for the United States, how the respondent first heard about the war, perceptions of the main reason why United States forces were fighting in the Persian Gulf, and the reliability of Israel as an ally of the United States. Part 4 (January 17-20 Combined) replicates questions from Part 3, the January 17 survey, and probes new areas, including whether the war to defeat Iraq would be worth the cost in human life and financial resources, whether news that the war had begun made the respondent feel more worried or relieved, whether members of Congress who voted against the use of military force were viewed more/less favorably, FBI interviews of Arab-American business/community leaders, Arab-American sympathy for Iraq, Israeli retaliation for future Iraqi missile attacks, opposition to the war via protest marches/rallies and their effect on the war effort, military/economic aid to Israel, whether the United States military was holding back information about the war, if following the war news had affected the respondent's schedule, and whether the United States was correct to enter the Vietnam War. Questions unique to Part 5 (January 17) include whether the respondent felt proud about the United States' actions in the Persian Gulf, and whether getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait or the outcome of the struggle for freedom in the Soviet Union was of more importance to the United States. Questions unique to Part 6 (January 18) include whether Israel should retaliate for future Iraqi missile attacks. Part 7 (January 19) repeats questions from Part 6. Questions asked in Part 8 (January 20) include whether military/economic aid to Israel should be increased. Questions unique to Part 9 (February 12-13) consider whether Iraqi troops could be forced out of Kuwait by continued bombing or if a ground war would be necessary, the timing of the start of a ground war, whether a ground war would be worth the loss of thousands of American troops, the targeting of civilian as well as military locations for bombing, Israel's involvement in the war, continuing to fight until Hussein was removed from power vs. ending the war when Iraqi troops left Kuwait, whether removing Hussein from power would be worth the cost of thousands of American troops, effects of the war on the respondent, the timing of negotiations to end the war, the United States' inflicting excessive damage on Iraq, paying the cost of rebuilding Iraq after the war, the effect of the war on government's ability to function in other areas, and satisfaction with the accuracy and quantity of war-related information. Questions unique to Part 10 (February 24) involve whether the United States was correct to begin the ground war, the anticipated length of the ground war, whether Bush tried hard enough to reach a diplomatic solution before beginning the ground war, whether the United States and Iraq were close to a negotiated settlement before the ground war began, and opinions of Mikhail Gorbachev and his motives in trying to negotiate an end to the war. Questions unique to Part 11 (February 25) examine whether the United States should set up a new government in Iraq if Saddam Hussein was removed from power, whether United States troops should remain in the Gulf after the war to insure stability in the region, the extent to which the people of Iraq were to blame for allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power, and whether the United States should allow the Kuwaiti royal family to return to its position leading Kuwait after the war.
Curated
Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice (ICPSR 1059)
Released/updated on: 1996-01-03
Geographic coverage: United States
These data and/or computer programs are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the INVESTIGATOR(S) if further information is desired.
Curated
Conflict Management by International Organizations, 1945-1970 (ICPSR 5303)
Released/updated on: 2009-09-17
Geographic coverage: Global
Time period: 1945-01-01--1970-01-01
This study contains data on 146 disputes in different geographical regions of the world that were managed by international or regional organizations in the period 1945-1970. Part of the project on Studies in International Integration of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California (Berkeley), this study was aimed at addressing how much difference international organizations have made in the management of international conflicts. Data are provided for conflicts brought before at least one of the following organizations whose primary concern was conflict management among members: United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, Arab League, and the Council of Europe. For each dispute, data are provided for the name of the conflict, issues at stake, power status of the parties involved, responses of the international organizations involved in managing the dispute, interstate nature of the dispute, duration of hostilities, civil and military fatalities, likelihood of the dispute abating, disappearing, or escalating if the disputing parties were left to themselves by the international organizations, and the likelihood that the United States and the Soviet Union would engage in a major war over the dispute, involving the use of nuclear weapons or massive conventional weapons on several fronts. A summary scale was developed by the investigators to measure the intensity levels of each dispute, and to score the successes of organizational management of the dispute.
Curated
Interstate Security Conflicts, 1945-1974 (ICPSR 7536)
Released/updated on: 1992-02-16
Geographic coverage: Global
Time period: 1945-01-01--1974-01-01
This data collection contains information about 310 cases of interstate conflict that had a political-security focus and occurred between 1945 and 1974. Each case represents a conflict management problem associated with particular conflicts. Cases are characterized in terms of the goals of the parties and management agents as perceived by the international community at the time of the conflict. Thus, a case may not correspond directly to a conflict. (One case may represent several different conflicts and a conflict may result in several cases.) For each conflict management problem, data exists that identifies the core case and describes conflict characteristics (e.g., type of issue, number of fatalities, duration, and likelihood of abatement if no management agents became involved), management influence (e.g., specific agents -- including a range of 45 specific organizations and governments, agent's bias, and agent's previous involvement), and management action (e.g., at what phase of conflict the agent became involved, phase of strongest action, and technique of management action).
Curated
Nonbinding Suggestions and Dispute Rates: Uncertainty, Focal Points, and their Effects on Bargaining Outcomes (ICPSR 25323)
Released/updated on: 2010-09-27
Time period: 2000-09-01--2003-10-01
This paper focuses on the effects of nonbinding recommendations on bargaining outcomes. Recommendations are theorized to have two effects: they can create a focal point for final bargaining positions, and they can decrease outcome uncertainty should dispute persist. While the focal point effect may help lower dispute rates, the uncertainty reduction effect is predicted to do the opposite for risk-averse bargainers. Which of these effects dominates is of critical importance in the optimal design of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, which are becoming increasingly utilized to help resolve disputes in a variety of settings. We theoretically examine the effects of recommendations on the bargaining contract zone. Our theoretical framework, which allows bargainers' final positions to influence a binding outcome should negotiations fail, provides for a more stringent test of focal points than previously considered. We also present data from controlled laboratory bargaining experiments that are consistent with our model of recommendation effects. Recommendations are empirically shown to influence final bargaining positions and negotiated settlement values. Furthermore, dispute rates are significantly lower when one includes recommendations, even where the recommendation is completely ignored in final-stage arbitration. This highlights a potentially significant role for the use of nonbinding procedures, such as mediation, as a preliminary stage in developing more efficient ADR procedures.
Curated
Transactional Data Bank of International Conflict and Amity Events (ICPSR 5210)
Released/updated on: 1992-02-16
Geographic coverage: Cyprus, Cambodia, Sudan, Malaysia, Paraguay, Portugal, Iceland, Global, Syria, North Korea, Greece, South Korea, Austria, El Salvador, Morocco, Iran, Luxembourg, Panama, Brazil, Guatemala, Iraq, Chile, Laos, Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina, Hungary, Japan, Ghana, India, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Honduras, Peru, Germany, Ethiopia, Haiti, Afghanistan, United States, Egypt, China (Peoples Republic), Thailand, Bolivia, Libya, Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, Sweden, Pakistan, Ireland, Poland, France, Jordan, Tunisia, Romania, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Philippines, United Kingdom, Burma, Switzerland, Spain, Lebanon, Liberia, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Norway, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Israel, Australia, Soviet Union, Indonesia
Time period: 1954-01-01--1961-01-01
This study contains data on about 7,025 conflictual and friendly events between 84 countries and 40 international organizations in the period 1954-1961. Data are provided for hostile transactional events, ranging from protests, accusations, and recall of officials to quasi-military actions, troop mobilizations, and war, and for amity events, ranging from offers to negotiate and confer to exchanges, agreements, and alliances. Events are qualified in 19 categories, including date, initiator, target, location, nature and intensity of event or tension, presence of violence, duration, number involved, killed, injured, or arrested, amount of military and civilian property damage, monetary exchange, politically significant persons involved in the event, and third parties involved in the event. The direction of the event and its retaliatory or nonretaliatory character are also included. A summary scale was developed by the investigators to measure the intensity levels of both hostile and friendly behaviors characterizing the event.