Showing 1 – 6 of 6 results.
Self-published
Ethno-Territorial Civil War: Conventional vs. Guerrilla Strategies (ICPSR 149341)
Released/updated on: 2021-09-05
Geographic coverage: Earth
Time period: 1945-01-01--2013-12-31
In ethno-territorial civil wars, which factors influence whether rebels choose and retain conventional warfare as their primary military strategy throughout the conflict, or whether they use guerrilla warfare as a primary strategy during periods judged to be less advantageous to conventional warfare? We find some support for the traditionally dominant explanation—relative power. We also find that rebel leaders with more intense, far-reaching nationalist goals are more likely to employ guerrilla warfare as a primary war strategy. By contrast, status quo conditions or a high level of state democracy do not have significant influences.
Curated
Simple Crosstabs
2012 Chicago Council Survey on American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (ICPSR 36230)
Released/updated on: 2015-12-07
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 2012-01-01--2012-12-31
The Chicago Surveys are part of a long-running series of public opinion surveys conducted by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs every two years. This study is the 2012 Chicago Council Survey, designed to investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public on matters related to foreign policy, and to define the parameters of public opinion within which decision-makers must operate.
The 2012 Chicago Council Survey focuses on respondents' opinions of the United States' leadership role in the world and the challenges the country faces domestically and internationally.
The survey covers the following international topics: relations with other countries, role in foreign affairs, possible threats to vital interests in the next ten years, foreign policy goals, benefits or drawbacks of globalization, situations that might justify the use of United States troops in other parts of the world, the number and location of United States military bases overseas, respondent feelings toward people of other countries, opinions on the influence of other countries in the world and how much influence those countries should have, United States participation in potential treaties, the United States' role in the United Nations and NATO, which side the United States should take in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, what measures should be taken to deal with Iran's nuclear program, the military effort in Afghanistan, opinions on efforts to combat terrorism, and the rise of China as a global power.
Domestic issues include economic prospects for American children when they become adults, funding for government programs, the fairness of the current distribution of income in the United States, climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, and United States dependence on foreign energy sources.
Demographic and other background information include age, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, left-right political self-placement, political affiliation, employment status, highest level of education, and religious preference. Also included are household size and composition, whether the respondent is head of household, household income, housing type, ownership status of living quarters, household Internet access, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) status, and region and state of residence.
Curated
Foreign Affairs Perspectives of United States Business and Military Elites, 1973 (ICPSR 7491)
Released/updated on: 2006-01-18
Geographic coverage: United States, Global
This study explored perspectives and sources of opinions about United States foreign policy among American business and military elites. The data collection includes information obtained from surveys of military and business elites, as well as content analysis of articles on American intervention abroad published in business and military journals. Military officers (Part 1) and senior business executives (Part 2) were asked about causes of war, prospects for peace, the most serious domestic and international problems faced by the United States, and possible solutions to these problems. Respondents' views on military and economic aid, defense spending, maintaining troops overseas, and the presence of ground troops in Vietnam were also assessed. Of the survey variables, 62 are common to the military and business officials. A limited number of separate questions were also asked of each individual group. Part 3 contains variables coded from content analysis of articles published in military and business journals, focusing on the authors' attitudes toward various acts of political, diplomatic, or military intervention as well as economic sanctions. Also explored were the apparent reasons for such attitudes, whether economic, strategic, or ideological. The study sought to identify patterns of media responses that might account for the formation of, or changes in, opinions among business or military circles.
Curated
Escalation of Great Power Disputes: Deterrence Versus Structural Realism, 1816-1984 (ICPSR 6355)
Released/updated on: 2006-01-12
Geographic coverage: Great Britain, Hungary, United States, Japan, China (Peoples Republic), Italy, France, Germany, Global, Soviet Union
Time period: 1816-01-01--1984-12-31
The purpose of this study was to test the relative explanatory power of two theoretical approaches--deterrence theory and structural realism--in predicting dispute escalation among "Great Powers" from 1816 to 1984. The Great Powers during this time period are identified as Great Britain, France, Russia/Soviet Union, Austria-Hungary, Prussia/Germany, Italy, the United States, Japan, and China. A Great Power deterrence encounter is defined as the explicit verbal threat of force or the movement and buildup of military forces in preparation for armed conflict by a challenging Great Power and a counterthreat by the defending Great Power. Variables measure dispute escalation, system uncertainty, risk propensity, balance of conventional military capabilities of challenger and defender, defender's possession of second-strike nuclear capability, interests at stake for challenger and defender, past behavior of challenger and defender, and current dispute involvement of challenger and defender. Part 2, Deterrence Variables Data, contains the complete set of variables, and Part 1, Deterrence Final Equation Data, is a subset of Part 2.
Curated
CBS News/New York Times Persian Gulf War Polls, January-February 1991 (ICPSR 9619)
Released/updated on: 2006-01-12
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 1991-01-11--1991-02-25
This series of interviews tracks public opinion regarding the Persian Gulf War from the period immediately prior to the initiation of bombing in January 1991 to the ensuing ground combat in February. In addition to monitoring the evolving war, these data also provide an ongoing evaluation of the Bush presidency during that time period. Part 1 (January 5-7) examines sending troops to Saudi Arabia vs. staying out, the likelihood of war, Bush's efforts to find diplomatic solutions, negotiating with Saddam Hussein vs. forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait, the possibility of terrorist attacks in the United States, how closely the respondent followed the news of the Persian Gulf situation, military action against Iraq vs. waiting for sanctions to work, requiring a congressional declaration of war, Congress voting on a declaration of war before or after the January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal, the January 9 meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq's foreign minister, attempting to meet with Hussein before January 15, and what might happen in the Persian Gulf in the event of war or otherwise. Part 2 (January 11-13) poses questions identical to Part 1 and addresses new issues, including whether Bush had already decided prior to the January 15 deadline to send troops into battle, whether a Kuwaiti offer to trade part of its territory in exchange for Iraq's withdrawal would be an acceptable resolution to the crisis, whether congressional authorization of the use of force would increase the likelihood of war, how congressmen should vote concerning the authorization of force, what Bush should do if only one house of Congress votes in favor of the use of force, whether the failure of the meeting between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister on January 9 made war more likely, and more questions related to what might happen in the Persian Gulf in the event of war or otherwise. Part 3 (January 5-7, 17 Panel) replicates both Part 1, the January 5-7 survey, and Part 5, the January 17 survey. It also examines new issues, including whether the United States did the right thing in initiating military action against Iraq, whether the war would last weeks or months, the number of expected American casualties in the war, whether the United States should remove Saddam Hussein from power in addition to driving Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, bombing military targets in heavily populated civilian areas vs. targets not in heavily populated areas, impressions of how the war was proceeding for the United States, how the respondent first heard about the war, perceptions of the main reason why United States forces were fighting in the Persian Gulf, and the reliability of Israel as an ally of the United States. Part 4 (January 17-20 Combined) replicates questions from Part 3, the January 17 survey, and probes new areas, including whether the war to defeat Iraq would be worth the cost in human life and financial resources, whether news that the war had begun made the respondent feel more worried or relieved, whether members of Congress who voted against the use of military force were viewed more/less favorably, FBI interviews of Arab-American business/community leaders, Arab-American sympathy for Iraq, Israeli retaliation for future Iraqi missile attacks, opposition to the war via protest marches/rallies and their effect on the war effort, military/economic aid to Israel, whether the United States military was holding back information about the war, if following the war news had affected the respondent's schedule, and whether the United States was correct to enter the Vietnam War. Questions unique to Part 5 (January 17) include whether the respondent felt proud about the United States' actions in the Persian Gulf, and whether getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait or the outcome of the struggle for freedom in the Soviet Union was of more importance to the United States. Questions unique to Part 6 (January 18) include whether Israel should retaliate for future Iraqi missile attacks. Part 7 (January 19) repeats questions from Part 6. Questions asked in Part 8 (January 20) include whether military/economic aid to Israel should be increased. Questions unique to Part 9 (February 12-13) consider whether Iraqi troops could be forced out of Kuwait by continued bombing or if a ground war would be necessary, the timing of the start of a ground war, whether a ground war would be worth the loss of thousands of American troops, the targeting of civilian as well as military locations for bombing, Israel's involvement in the war, continuing to fight until Hussein was removed from power vs. ending the war when Iraqi troops left Kuwait, whether removing Hussein from power would be worth the cost of thousands of American troops, effects of the war on the respondent, the timing of negotiations to end the war, the United States' inflicting excessive damage on Iraq, paying the cost of rebuilding Iraq after the war, the effect of the war on government's ability to function in other areas, and satisfaction with the accuracy and quantity of war-related information. Questions unique to Part 10 (February 24) involve whether the United States was correct to begin the ground war, the anticipated length of the ground war, whether Bush tried hard enough to reach a diplomatic solution before beginning the ground war, whether the United States and Iraq were close to a negotiated settlement before the ground war began, and opinions of Mikhail Gorbachev and his motives in trying to negotiate an end to the war. Questions unique to Part 11 (February 25) examine whether the United States should set up a new government in Iraq if Saddam Hussein was removed from power, whether United States troops should remain in the Gulf after the war to insure stability in the region, the extent to which the people of Iraq were to blame for allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power, and whether the United States should allow the Kuwaiti royal family to return to its position leading Kuwait after the war.
Curated
Political Use of the United States Armed Forces, 1946-1976 (ICPSR 7595)
Released/updated on: 1992-02-16
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 1946-01-01--1976-12-31
The data in this collection were generated in 1976 as part of a Brookings Institution project studying the use of the United States Armed Forces as a political instrument. By the study's definition, political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a contest of violence. The study yielded 226 such cases between January 1, 1946, and December 31, 1976. The data can be grouped into seven categories: dates of the events, contextual characteristics of events, types and sizes of United States Armed Forces involved, movement and readiness of forces, activities of forces, non-United States actors involved, and United States public approval of the president within two months of the event.