Showing 1 – 5 of 5 results.
Self-published
National Neighborhood Data Archive (NaNDA): Post Offices and Banks by Census Tract and ZCTA, United States, 1990-2022 (ICPSR 208366)
Released/updated on: 2026-02-11
Geographic coverage: Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa
Time period: 1990-01-01--2022-12-31
This dataset contains measures of the number and density of post offices and banks per United States Census Tract or ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) from 1990 through 2022. The dataset includes four separate files for four different geographic areas (GIS shapefiles from the United States Census Bureau). The four geographies include:
- Census Tract 2010
- Census Tract 2020
- ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) 2010
- ZIP Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) 2020
Information about which dataset to use can be found in the Usage Notes section of the documentation.
Curated
Membership Structure and Occupational Credit Union Deposit Rates (ICPSR 1237)
Released/updated on: 2001-06-12
Geographic coverage: United States
Time period: 1997-01-01--1997-12-31
How do occupational credit unions set deposit rates? This article shows that the answer to this question depends on who actually makes business decisions in credit unions (who is in control), and whether local deposit market competition is important. It is not obvious who controls occupational credit unions. If the sponsor (the employer) is in control, then loans and deposits are priced to maximize the surplus received by all of the credit union's current and potential members (those eligible to join). If members are in control, then a group of members with a majority can maximize its own surplus. The group in control may include members whose primary purpose for joining the credit union is to borrow money or, alternatively, to lend money (make deposits). If local deposit-market competition is the dominant influence, then internal characteristics of the credit union won't matter at all. This study tests the sponsor-control, the member-control, and the market-control hypotheses against each other using a large sample of occupational credit unions observed in 1997. The results suggest that sponsors exercise effective control over occupational credit unions.
Curated
Bank Competition and Concentrations: The Impact of Credit Unions (ICPSR 1224)
Released/updated on: 2000-08-28
Geographic coverage: United States
One aspect of the financial services industry is that for-profit institutions, such as commercial banks, compete directly with not-for-profit financial intermediaries, such as credit unions. In this article, the authors analyze the competition between banks and credit unions. Using annual county-level data on banking-market concentration and household participation rates at occupational credit unions for the period between 1989 and 1996, the authors find empirical evidence of two-way competitive interactions between banks and credit unions.
Curated
Credit Unions and the Common Bond (ICPSR 1214)
Released/updated on: 2000-01-18
Geographic coverage: United States
A distinguishing feature of credit unions is the legal requirement that members share a common bond. This organizing principle recently became the focus of national attention when the Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress took opposite sides in a controversy regarding the number of common bonds (fields of membership) that could coexist within a single credit union. In this article, a model of credit union formation and consolidation is developed and simulated to examine the effects of common-bond restrictions on the performance of credit unions. The performance measures are based on participation rates among potential members and the operating costs of credit unions. Using a semiparametric econometric model and a large dataset drawn from federally-chartered occupational credit unions in 1996, the authors find that, for a given number of potential members, credit unions with multiple-group charters have higher participation rates. They also find that, for a given number of members, the operating costs of multiple-group credit unions are higher. Average operating costs at large credit unions, however, decrease as the number of members increases. The authors also find that local deposit-market concentration is related to participation rates and operating costs of credit unions.
Curated
Wages and Risk-Taking in Occupational Credit Unions: Theory and Evidence (ICPSR 1202)
Released/updated on: 1999-08-18
Geographic coverage: United States
Most occupational credit unions serve (in part) as a means for corporate sponsors to deliver tax-favored benefits to their employees. Credit union managers administer this transfer of benefits, but their performance is difficult to measure, particularly in larger credit unions. In this article, the authors develop a model of efficiency wages and optimal risk-taking and then provide empirical evidence from a large sample of occupational credit unions. Higher wage expenses are found in larger credit unions. In addition, the authors find a negative relationship between credit union size and risk-taking. They also find that local deposit-market concentration is a significant factor in explaining wage costs and risk-taking in occupational credit unions.