Replication Data for: Raising Grievances to the State: The Political Economic Effects of Anti-Corruption Crackdowns on Labor Activism in China (ICPSR 308415)
This replication package accompanies "Raising Grievances to the State: The Political Economic Effects of Anti-Corruption Crackdowns on Labor Activism in China" (Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 181, April 2026). The paper studies how government actions shape workers' expected returns to striking by exploiting China's 2012 anti-corruption campaign as a natural experiment. Using a city-level dataset linking Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) corruption inspections to labor strikes from 2011 to 2020, the analysis shows that strike incidents rise sharply after a city's first high-profile inspection, driven largely by wage-arrears disputes at private firms and concentrated in the construction and manufacturing sectors. Strikes also spread through network channels, with later-treated and neighboring cities responding to inspections elsewhere. The evidence indicates that inspections weakened firm-government ties and shifted government attention, raising workers' expected returns to striking and revealing pre-existing grievances.
The package contains the Stata (.do) and R (.R) scripts, cleaned prefecture-city-month and prefecture-city-quarter panel datasets, and documentation needed to reproduce every table and figure in the paper and its appendix, along with a README describing the data-cleaning sequence, computational requirements, and dataset provenance. Several restricted-access source files (a corruption-investigation microdataset, a national tax survey extract, and a prefecture panel from a related study) are not redistributed per their original data-use agreements; the README documents how to obtain them and which results depend on them.