Showing 1 – 3 of 3 results.
Self-published
Replication data for: Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan (ICPSR 112875)
Released/updated on: 2019-10-11
We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers. (JEL C93, D02, D72, K42, O17)
Self-published
Replication data for: Violence and Risk Preference: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan (ICPSR 112721)
Released/updated on: 2019-10-11
We investigate the relationship between violence and economic risk
preferences in Afghanistan combining: (i) a two-part experimental
procedure identifying risk preferences, violations of Expected Utility,
and specific preferences for certainty; (ii) controlled recollection of
fear based on established methods from psychology; and (iii) administrative
violence data from precisely geocoded military records. We
document a specific preference for certainty in violation of Expected
Utility. The preference for certainty, which we term a Certainty
Premium, is exacerbated by the combination of violent exposure
and controlled fearful recollections. The results have implications
for risk taking and are potentially actionable for policymakers and
marketers.
Self-published
Replication data for: Why Do Defaults Affect Behavior? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan (ICPSR 116198)
Released/updated on: 2019-12-07
We report on an experiment examining why default options impact behavior. By randomly assigning employees to different varieties of a salary-linked savings account, we find that default enrollment increases participation by 40 percentage points—an effect equivalent to providing a 50% matching incentive. We then use a series of experimental interventions to differentiate between explanations for the default effect, which we conclude is driven largely by present-biased preferences and the cognitive cost of thinking through different savings scenarios. Default assignment also changes employees' attitudes toward saving, and makes them more likely to actively decide to save after the study concludes.