Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games (ICPSR 34573)

Version Date: Mar 27, 2013

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Principal Investigator(s):
Pedro Dal Bo, Brown University

https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1

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Summary

While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions. (JEL C72, C73, C91, C92)

Citation

Bo, Pedro Dal. Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-03-27. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1

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Distributor(s)

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
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Data Collection Notes

  1. The zipped package contains Stata, PDF, and text files, which provide data, tables, and figures used in the publication.

  2. These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.

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Original Release Date

2013-03-27

Version History

2018-02-15 The citation of this study may have changed due to the new version control system that has been implemented. The previous citation was:
  • Bo, Pedro Dal. Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. ICPSR34573-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-03-27. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1
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Notes

  • These data are flagged as replication datasets and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.

  • The public-use data files in this collection are available for access by the general public. Access does not require affiliation with an ICPSR member institution.