The Welfare Impact Of Collusion Under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination Of Efficient Cartel Theory (ICPSR 34351)

Published: Jan 30, 2013

Principal Investigator(s):
Jason Taylor, Central Michigan University

Version V1

This collection focuses on the welfare impact of collusion under various industry characteristics. The data were assembled using publically available administrative records data, census/enumeration data and observational data from the industry level. Industries represented in this collection include asphalt, auto parts, brick, iron, paper-pulp, and rubber industries, as well as those dealing in other types of products and raw materials.

Taylor, Jason. The Welfare Impact Of Collusion Under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination Of Efficient Cartel Theory. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-01-30.

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National Science Foundation (0718380)


1927-01 -- 1937-12

1927-01 -- 1937-12

This collection has been minimally processed; data appear as they were received from the principal investigator. No additional information was provided. Therefore, ICPSR cannot confirm what each of the variables measure.

This research aimed to examine cartel performance in the United States under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Additionally, two distinct "efficient cartel" hypotheses were tested that claim inter-firm coordination can increase economic efficiency in industries with a large degree of avoidable fixed costs and/or variable output.

A monthly panel of data for 66 cartelized industries was used to perform a broad empirical test of the dynamics of the efficient-cartel thesis. Additionally, a 'second stage' regression was employed, which used estimated parameters from the first stage as dependent variables, to examine whether those industries that faced higher fixed costs and uncertainty of demand had significantly different welfare effect outcomes under collusion.

Various industry cartels within the United States in the 1920s and 1930s.



These data were collected in the 1920s and 1930s by various government agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Industrial Conference Board; most are available online from the National Bureau of Economic Research Web site.

administrative records data

census/enumeration data

observational data



2013-01-30 ICPSR data undergo a confidentiality review and are altered when necessary to limit the risk of disclosure. ICPSR also routinely creates ready-to-go data files along with setups in the major statistical software formats as well as standard codebooks to accompany the data. In addition to these procedures, ICPSR performed the following processing steps for this data collection:

  • Checked for undocumented or out-of-range codes.


  • Data in this collection are available only to users at ICPSR member institutions.

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