This course presents research that uses game theoretic models in detail. The object is to lead the student through how such models are used in research. The two goals of the course are building technical ability to solve and use such models in research and providing a deep understanding of key articles in this type of research.

The class covers the topics with a combination of sessions on general types of models and others which discuss a particular example of that model in the literature. Sessions that cover a general type of model will often be followed with a problem set. I have organized the course by topics in game theory and attempted to have the level of technical difficulty increase throughout the course. The papers also cover a range of topics across all subfields of political science in addition to a range of types of models. The focus of discussion will be the motivation of the model, the proof of the equilibrium, and how the paper might be extended.

I am open to the idea of covering other papers of particular interest to students at their suggestion. If there is a paper you always wanted to understand in detail, this is your chance. Please send any such suggestions to me as soon as possible.

Although the course seeks to teach modeling skills, it also assumes that the student has had at least one course in game theory already at least at the level of the Introduction to Game Theory course in the first session. Students should be aware that I do not intend to teach the basic concepts of game theory.

The course requires students to complete the homework assignments. Depending on student interest, I will consider proposals to work on original models of the student’s design during the course. I will also consider having students lead some of the presentations of papers, although I will be prepared to offer “backup.”

This course does not use a book. For those students who would like to purchase a high-level game theory book for their own reference, I have the following three recommendations:

Fudenberg and Tirole, *Game Theory*, MIT Press
Osborne and Rubinstein, *A Course in Game Theory*, MIT Press

Schedule of Classes

July 18: Introductory Meeting: Review of Math and Basics of Game Theory

July 19-20: Backwards Induction, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
July 21-22: Signaling Games: Continuous Types

July 25-27: Bargaining Models

July 28-29: Cheap Talk and Multiple Equilibria

August 1-2: Repeated Games, Folk Theorem

August 3: Commitment

August 4-5: Median Voter Models

August 8-9: Selectorate Models; Microeconomic Models
   Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival*, Ch. 3

August 10-11: Markov Perfect Equilibrium

August 12: War of Attrition Models