Escalation of Great Power Disputes: Deterrence Versus Structural Realism, 1816-1984: Detailed Description

Data Citation

Huth, Paul, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett. Escalation of Great Power Disputes: Deterrence Versus Structural Realism, 1816-1984. ICPSR06355-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1995. doi:10.3886/ICPSR06355.v1

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Description & Citation--Study No. 6355

Bibliographic Description
Scope of Study
Methodology
Access and Availability

Bibliographic Description

Study No.:

06355

Title:

Escalation of Great Power Disputes: Deterrence Versus Structural Realism, 1816-1984

Principal Investigator(s):

Huth, Paul

Gelpi, Christopher

Bennett, D. Scott

Funding:

National Science Foundation (SES 9023067)

Bibliographic Citation:

Scope of Study

Summary:

The purpose of this study was to test the relative explanatory power of two theoretical approaches--deterrence theory and structural realism--in predicting dispute escalation among "Great Powers" from 1816 to 1984. The Great Powers during this time period are identified as Great Britain, France, Russia/Soviet Union, Austria-Hungary, Prussia/Germany, Italy, the United States, Japan, and China. A Great Power deterrence encounter is defined as the explicit verbal threat of force or the movement and buildup of military forces in preparation for armed conflict by a challenging Great Power and a counterthreat by the defending Great Power. Variables measure dispute escalation, system uncertainty, risk propensity, balance of conventional military capabilities of challenger and defender, defender's possession of second-strike nuclear capability, interests at stake for challenger and defender, past behavior of challenger and defender, and current dispute involvement of challenger and defender. Part 2, Deterrence Variables Data, contains the complete set of variables, and Part 1, Deterrence Final Equation Data, is a subset of Part 2.

Subject Terms:

armed conflict, defense (military), deterrence, international conflict, military intervention, military strategies, military strength

Geographic Coverage:

China (Peoples Republic), France, Germany, Global, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union, United States

Time Period:

1816--1984

Date of Collection:

1991--1992

Universe:

Deterrence encounters involving Great Powers during the period 1816-1984.

Data Types:

aggregate data

Data Collection Notes:

Data for this study were extracted in part from CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WAR DATA, 1816-1992 (ICPSR 9905) and POLITY DATA: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, 1800-1971 (ICPSR 5010). For a more detailed description of the current dataset, users may consult the related publications listed below.

Methodology

Data Source:

CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WAR DATA, 1816-1992 (ICPSR 9905) and POLITY DATA: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, 1800-1971 (ICPSR 5010)

Access and Availability

Note:

Detailed file-level information (such as record length, case count, and variable count) is listed in the file manifest.

Original ICPSR Release:

1995-03-16

Version History:

2006-01-12 All files were removed from dataset 7 and flagged as study-level files, so that they will accompany all downloads.

Dataset(s):

DS1: Deterrence Final Equation Data
DS2: SAS Data Definition Statements for Deterrence Final Equation Data
DS3: SPSS Export File for Deterrence Final Equation Data
DS4: Deterrence Variables Data
DS5: SAS Data Definition Statements for Deterrence Variables Data
DS6: SPSS Export File for Deterrence Variables Data