Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games (ICPSR 34573)
Principal Investigator(s): Bo, Pedro Dal, Brown University
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions. (JEL C72, C73, C91, C92)
These data are flagged as replication datasets and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.
These data are freely available.
Bo, Pedro Dal. Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. ICPSR34573-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-03-27. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1
Persistent URL: http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1
Scope of Study
Data Collection Notes:
The zipped package contains Stata, PDF, and text files, which provide data, tables, and figures used in the publication.
These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.
Original ICPSR Release: 2013-03-27
- Citations exports are provided above.
Export Study-level metadata (does not include variable-level metadata)