Principal Investigator(s): Ho, Giang, University of California-Los Angeles; Pennington-Cross, Anthony, Marquette University
Federal, state, and local predatory lending laws are designed to restrict and in some cases prohibit certain types of high-cost mortgage credit in the subprime market. Empirical evidence using the spatial variation in these laws shows that the aggregate flow of high-cost mortgage credit can increase, decrease, or be unchanged after these laws are enacted. Although it may seem counterintuitive to find that a law that prohibits lending could be associated with more lending, it is hypothesized that a law may reduce the cost of sorting honest loans from dishonest loans and lessens borrowers' fears of predation, thus stimulating the high-cost mortgage market.
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Ho, Giang, and Anthony Pennington-Cross. The Varying Effects of Predatory Lending Laws on High-Cost Mortgage Applications. ICPSR01342-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2007-03-16. doi:10.3886/ICPSR01342.v1
Persistent URL: http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01342.v1
This study was funded by:
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Research Division
Scope of Study
Geographic Coverage: United States
Data Collection Notes:
These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigators if further information is desired.
Original ICPSR Release: 2007-03-16
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